No plan: fiasco after Saddam’s fall

Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone

by Rajiv Chandrasekaran 

Chandrasekaran’s book was originally published in 2006 by Alfred A. Knopf Publishing in New York. Chandrasekaran was Baghdad’s Bureau Chief for the Washington Post during America’s first year in Iraq. The book won the Samuel Johnson Award, the Overseas Press Club Annual Book Award and The Ron Ridenhour Prize. It was also a finalist for the National Book Award, the Helen Bernstein Award for Excellence in Journalism and The Los Angeles Times Book Prize.

The book was also included in The New York Times “Ten Best Reads for 2007” and the Los Angeles Times and Entertainment Weekly’s “Top Ten for 2006.” The book has also found a new audience since the release this year  of the movie “Green Zone” which was loosely based on Chandrasekaran’s book.

The book focused on the takeover of Iraq by the Americans and specifically the operational group, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and its role in the first year of occupation. It was a deeper look into what they did or did not do in Iraq. Chandrasekan was filing a daily report for the Washington Post from Iraq in his capacity as Bureau Chief and completed his book on his return to America.

Chandrasekaran’s book delves deeper into the work done by the American CPA. It gives substantially more information than was originally published in newspapers at the time. Focusing on how people were recruited for the CPA, what individuals and groups were trying to achieve and where it all went wrong.

Summary of the book’s contents:

Chandrasekaran’s chapter titling gives the reader a very good insight into what aspects of the Iraqi takeover he is focusing on and the many stories told within this one book.

The Chapter names are:
Part one: Building the Bubble

1. Versailles on the Tigris
2. A Deer in the Headlights
3. You’re in Charge!
4. Control Freak
5. Who are these people?
6. We need to rethink this
7. Bring a duffle bag
8. A Yearning for the Old Times.

The “Building of the Bubble” looks at the CPA finding a place for the American headquarters, the recruiting of the CPA staff and the overall progress the CPA moves through. The chapter titling highlights the confusion and misunderstandings within the CPA of what their role was and what they were trying to achieve in Iraq. Chandrasekaran reiterated this in an interview after returning to America,

“The White House and the National Security Council have a responsibility to coordinate the work of various cabinet departments through the interagency process, and come up with a unified plan. There wasn’t one. There was no plan.” (Chandrasekaran cited in Kosar, 2007)

The chapter titling in the second part of the book, follows the same thread and these are as enlightening as Part One.

Part Two: Shattered Dreams

9. Let this be Over
10. The Plan Unravels
11. A Fools Errand
12. We Cannot Continue Like This
13. Missed Opportunities
14. Breaking the Rules
15. Crazy, if not Suicidal
16. A Lot left to be Done

The second part focuses on how it all went wrong –- the lack of planning, the absence of any organization, the initial lack of foresight and understanding when recruiting for the CPA. This all leads to people being chosen who were not up to the task. The book does highlight some positive experiences of people succeeding in their projects even if they had to fight extremely hard to get these successes.

The main problem, according to Chandrasekaran, was the leader of the CPA Paul (Jerry) Bremer and his idea of what Iraq needed. Instead of fixing basic infrastructure and basic life necessities, such as running water and electricity, the CPA was concentrating on traffic rules and copyright laws. The CPA was arrogant and insensitive to the Iraqi culture and way of life. Rather than looking at ways to advance and improve their lifestyle, the CPA was trying to change Iraq into a new America.

“There was no clear mandate, so, initially it was, “We’re going to do everything. We’re going to micro-manage this country.” (Chandrasekaran cited in Kosar, 2007)

To illustrate this point, Chandrasekaran draws an analogy with a broken-down old bus: “You could change the spark plugs, pour some oil into the engine, and get it moving, even though it would be belching smoke and not moving very fast. That’s what the Iraqis wanted. Now, Bremer’s approach was, “Ah, this broken-down bus — we’re going to put the bus up on the blocks, take the engine out, and rebuild it bolt by bolt. And at the end of the day, when we’re all done, we’ll give you the best bus around.” But the Iraqi people, the passengers, didn’t just want to sit by the side of the road and wait for the CPA to do that.” (Chandrasekaran cited in Kosar, 2007)

Newsworthy revelations in the book.

The four relevant facts Chandrasekaran brought to light in this book and those which I also thought to be important were:

1. The total disorganization of the CPA, and their lack of planning and co-ordination
2. The insensitivity shown by the Americans towards the Iraqi people
3. The initial CPA recruitment process, and how Bush chose people to work for the CPA, and
4. The CPA and the American administration’s overall lack of knowledge of the Iraqi people and the political power forces already existing in Iraq. This subsequently led to the CPA’s inability to use this knowledge in rebuilding the country

The CPA’s lack of organization was evident throughout the book. There are many stories based on lack of knowledge, lack of equipment or just lack of understanding. Chandrasekaran uses these stories from his interviews most effectively.

“Rather than directly criticizing those responsible for the strategic decision to invade, and the tactical conduct of the war, Chandrasekaran invites us to make up our own minds. (Aburish, 2010)
It would have been so easy for Chandrasekaran to come in throwing punches and blame, but he refrained, making his writing more credible.

The second point which was evident in the book, was the insensitivity shown to the Iraqis by the Americans. By re-occupying Saddam’s palace seemed to indicate to me that they saw this as a heavy handed attempt at signaling a power transition while failing to recognize that the Saddam palace was a symbol of what was not needed/wanted in Iraq, thus not sending a positive message to the Iraqi people.

They then proceeded to barricade themselves in behind high blast walls (the green zone), ignoring the fact that they were in a Muslim country, and treating “the green zone” as their little patch of America.

“Let’s look at the food that they were eating in the CPA palace. Here you are, in the heart of a Muslim country, and what did Halliburton manage to serve at seemingly every meal? Some form of pork — bacon for breakfast, hot dogs for lunch. There were a number of Iraqis, who felt that this was offensive, and they complained, and their complaints were blown off. “

“The fact that the Americans had set themselves up in one of Saddam’s palaces — look, the CPA needed to have a headquarters. I’m not going to try to say that it didn’t need a place with a secure perimeter for Americans to live and work. But Saddam’s presidential palace? Why not just board it up and tell the Iraqi people, ‘We’re going to keep this as a museum to the excesses of the Saddam regime.’ Turn it into a Versailles type of thing, instead of setting up shop in it, which sent a really negative message to the Iraqis.” (Chandrasekaran cited in Kosar, 2007)

The third noteworthy aspect is the CPA recruitment process was undertaken by Bush and the White House. Chandrasekaran wrote that the government hired people based on their political views and how close they were to the Bush Administration. While it is understandable they would send people over they trust and believe in, it is counter-productive sending people who lacked the knowledge/skills to get the job done.

“The primary criterion for a position inside the Green Zone was not someone’s relevant experience, but one’s political connections. Candidates were chosen based on their views on abortion and for whom they had voted in 2000.” (Chandrasekaran citied in Rife, 2007)

The fourth point and I think the most intolerable is that many of the people within the CPA lacked knowledge or interest in the Iraqi way of life.

“In general, these ‘leaders’ displayed a stunning ignorance of Iraqi society. Most felt no need to study anything about its history, culture or day-to-day life. And they had little sense of the growth of resistance movements.” (Nyden, 2007)

The people in charge were not aware of the problems within the Iraqi community and were unable or unwilling to learn anything about it. This blindfold approach could only spell failure and as such be devastating for the Iraqi people.

“Instead of sending the very best people, there were a lot of people who, quite frankly, weren’t. This is not my assessment — it’s the assessment of senior officials of the CPA. The deputy director of the CPA’s Washington office told me, on the record, “We didn’t send the A-team. Bremer himself was concerned about this and raised the issue repeatedly in secure video teleconferences.” (Chandrasekaran cited in Kosar, 2007)

Analysis of how the journalists gathered their material, whether it was in documents, interviews or first-hand observation.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran was a journalist in Bagdad during the first year of the CPA’s occupation of Iraq, so he had a good knowledge of what was being achieved by the Americans. His daily submissions to the Washington Post and the notes he kept from his time in Iraq, although insufficient for this book, gave him a start with the material. On his return to America he realized that to write a book he would have to re-interview CPA staff in an attempt to gain more comprehensive understanding of what happened within “The Green Zone.”

“It wasn’t until many of those people came back to America, plugged back into their normal lives, went back to their families, went back to their normal day jobs, and then began to look at Iraq from afar, many of those people became disillusioned. I like to joke that there is a whole class of people in Washington who worked in Iraq for the CPA. Today they are in desperate need of therapy. And I offered it for free to them with my notebook and a cup of coffee, or a beer.

Often I sat down with these individuals for three, four, five hours at a stretch, and let them unload. And it was in those conversations, after their return to the United States, that I was really able to get and develop a fuller understanding of how the CPA operated.” (Chandrasekaran cited in Kosar, 2007)

The author’s observations contributed significantly to the book’s content. However, it was his ability to ask the right questions after the fact that extracted the true story. I do not think during the time of the CPA occupation he would have been able to obtain enough information to gain a full insight, and tell the story in the way he was able to as ex-CPA staff would have been fearful of losing their jobs.

Following the CPA’s dissolution and Bremer’s announcing Iraq as a success, the CPA staff moved on to new jobs. This gave former staff the opportunity to reflect on their time in Iraq and their achievements, which created a perfect time for Chandrasekaran to turn up with notebook in hand.

“Chandrasekaran brings to life the small world of the roughly 1,500 individuals (overwhelmingly American, with a few British and others) who manned the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was lodged in the Green Zone…” (Brown, 2007)

Chandrasekaran is impartial in his observations and writings, when talking about the situation inside the Green Zone and within the Iraqi community. He was able to clearly illustrate a connection between the CPA’s lack of organization and lack of application leading to the frustration of the Iraqi people who originally saw the Americans as a way to a better Iraq.

Analysis of any major legal issues the journalist faced in publishing the book:

Chandrasekaran did not seem to have any problems with legal action. This may be due to him talking to people who were willing to talk and contribute information.

He wrote the book after the CPA’s time in Iraq and so people had moved on. The public was or are now very aware the CPA did not complete what they set out to do in Iraq. Even the then Deputy Director of the CPA in Washington stated they did not send the “A team.”

Chandrasekaran is not writing anything new. He is however giving a very balanced insight and expanding on existing knowledge. When Chandrasekaran writes about the CPA and the people within it, he does not write in an aggressive manner. It is very matter of fact and he believes the people who went there had the best intentions, but lacked the knowledge to succeed.

For these reasons, I would suggest this is why Chandrasekaran had no problems in releasing the book.

Analysis of any particular ethical issues the journalist faced, either in gathering material for the book or in how they represented people and events in the book:

Chandrasekaran has gained information from his own first hand knowledge (having lived in Iraq) and from interviews and information given by former staff of CPA, a group that has since disbanded.

This, I think, means he has acted ethically, as far as I am aware, he was not stealing information, it was volunteered.

He has also written the book in a style, which does not always require an interviewee to be named and possibly some sources have requested not to be named. His even-handed approach to presenting the detail in this book would also contribute significantly to reducing the instance of ethical issues arising from these writings.

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