Domestic Political Incentives for the Gulf War

Condensed from article by Jon Wiener

Why did the United States fight the Gulf War? What factors entered into George Bush’s decision to avoid a negotiated solution? The timing of that decision goes some way to answering these questions, and two conflicting theories have been offered: first, that Bush wanted war from the beginning, but couldn’t make that clear until after the Congressional elections; second, that he did not come down firmly in favor of war until late October, when he decided to double the number of troops and set the timetable for air and ground attacks. Bob Woodward’s new book, The Commanders, provides important new information about this decision from General Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although Bush publicly declared on 5 August, ‘this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait,’ his efforts to reverse the invasion focused on UN sanctions and covert CIA operations; it was not until October, according to Woodward, that the president requested a military briefing on ‘how to conduct an offensive operation against Saddam’s forces.’ Late in October, before Bush decided to double US ground forces, Woodward writes, Powell tried to persuade the president that ‘containment’ of Iraq through economic and military pressures could force Saddam out of Kuwait without war, but that it would take time. Bush, according to Woodward’s account, answered, ‘I don’t think there’s time politically for that strategy.’

Problems began immediately after Baghdad fell--despite administration officials being warned, the National Museum (its collections going back to the beginning of human civilization) was looted while U.S. forces watched; later Wolfowitz claimed all but 38 artifacts were recovered, ignoring the thousands smashed and stolen from storerooms. Similarly, the National Library--a repository of Iraq's recent history was burned. Elsewhere almost two tons of Iraqi yellowcake was looted post invasion, again while U.S. troops were nearby; Saddam's supposed recent yellowcake acquisitions were part of the justification for the invasion. Looters also took high explosives used to initiate nuclear explosions. Personnel files with names/addresses of Saddam Fedayeen (those attacking US forces) were found and reported to Wolfowitz--again no action. The US had simply assumed that Iraq's police and bureaucrats would report for work the day after Baghdad fell--despite the warnings of experts.

Galbraith ultimately asks What would an Iraqi government govern? Answering his own question, he contends that it would not include the Kurdish area (Baghdad ministries are not even allowed to open offices there), the Shiite south (now run by clerics, militias, and religious parties as an Islamic state), nor Baghdad or the Sunni Arab heartland (will continue to be battlegrounds).

Galbraith's Recommendations: help the Kurds rule on their own, pull out of southern Iraq (would also give us more military strength vs. Iran), and put Sunni army/police in charge of Sunni areas while maintaining U.S. emergency reaction forces in the Kurdish areas.